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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appelllant, 
vs. 
MARVIN NEWELL GREEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Priority No. 2 
CASE NO. 981332-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals a final order of dismissal in a prosecution for possession of cocaine in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 
58-37-8(5)(vi)(1996); and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(5)(vi)(1996). 
These Counts were dismissed with prejudice following the trial court's order suppressing 
evidence. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that a level one 
police-citizen encounter rose to a level two seizure upon the officer's request to see 
Green's driver's license, and for permission to return with it to his patrol car. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the level two 
seizure was unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. Underlying fact findings are 
reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's conclusions of law, 
however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as regards the 
application of legal standards to the facts. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and nor Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Green was charged with possession of cocaine in a drug free zone, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(5)(vi)(1996); and 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(5)(vi)(1996) (R.2-1).1 Green's Motion to 
Suppress evidence seized from his person and vehicle pursuant to a warrantless search was 
granted following an evidentiary hearing (R. 27-24). Because the State was unable to proceed 
The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
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without the suppressed evidence, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the above charges (R. 
32-29). The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 34-33). 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Level-Two Seizure 
On or about January 3, 1998, Defendant Marvin Green was parked in a private parking lot 
at approximately 10:30 in the evening (R. 38:4). Green's vehicle was facing a curb which 
bordered some shrubbery and a fence (R. 38:5-6). Officer Roger Edwards of the Springville City 
Police Department observed Green's vehicle and decided to investigate. The officer stopped his 
vehicle behind Green's, at least partially blocking Green's ability to egress, approached Green 
and engage him in conversation (R. 38:9-10). Officer Edwards also noticed that the license 
plates on Green's vehicle were expired, but did not issue a citation because Green was parked 
on private property (R. 38:27). The officer reported that Green's responses to his initial 
questions were slow.2 Soon after the officer had engaged Green in conversation, Officer 
Edwards asked Green for identification, and Green produced a driver's license (R. 38:12). 
Officer Edwards then returned to his vehicle and did a warrant check on Green and discovered 
outstanding warrants (R. 38:12-14). After discovering outstanding warrants for Green's arrest, 
Officer Edwards arrested Green, and found evidence of controlled substances and paraphernalia 
on Green's person and inside his vehicle (R. 38:14). 
2Officer Edwards testified at the suppression hearing that Green's response to his question of whether 
Green was okay, was delayed "somewhere between 45 and 60 seconds." Green responded by asking the officer if 
he was doing something wrong. The officer then asked Green whether he had seen anyone recently pass through the 
parking lot, to which Green responded, after some delay, "I was just listening to my radio" (R. 38:10-11). 
3 
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Suppression Hearing 
At the close of the suppression hearing the state conceded that the officer's initial contact 
with Green rose to a level two seizure even before the officer asked Green for identification. The 
State argued "in this particular case the officer initiated a level one [stop], [but] immediately 
went to a level two as he discussed and conversed with the individual." (R. 38: 36). 
The officer testified at the suppression hearing during cross-examination that he had no 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity until he discovered Green's outstanding warrants. The 
officer testified that even though Green's slow responses raised some concern, until he 
discovered the warrants, he "didn't necessarily have a reason to hold him" (R. 38:29). 
It should also be noted that the State failed to submit to the trial court a written response 
to Green's Motion to Dismiss. 
Ruling 
The trial court determined that once Officer Edwards asked to see Green's identification, 
and for permission to return with it to his vehicle, he was "clearly seized within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment" (R. 25). The Court further held that the seizure "was unsupported by 
[reasonable], articulable facts," and as a result, granted Green's Motion to Suppress (R. 25-24). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly determined that Officer Edward's initial contact with Green had 
risen to a level two seizure at the time the officer requested from Green identification and 
permission to return with it to his patrol car. The Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant was 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when an officer "took [the defendant's] 
name and birth date and expected her to wait while he ran a warrants check." State v. Johnson. 
{ 
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805 P.2d 761, 762-763 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). In addition, the State argued at the close of the suppression hearing that the initial 
encounter "immediately went to a level two [stop] as [the officer] discussed and conversed with 
[Green]" (R. 38:36). Having already conceded that a level two seizure occurred, the State should 
not now be allowed to argue to the contrary. If the trial court's decision that a level two seizure 
occurred is erroneous, as the State contends, that error was clearly invited by the State. 
The trial court correctly determined that the level two seizure was unsupported by 
reasonable suspicion. The trial court held that the officer's concern that Green was under the 
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs fell short of reasonable suspicion; namely, because he failed 
to confirm or deny whether Green's behavior was the result of drug or alcohol use, or something 
else (R. 25). It should be noted that subsequent to Green's arrest, the officer discovered that 
Green's slow responses during the initial encounter were likely the result of a mental 
impairment.3 In addition, Appellant's repeated claims that Officer Edward's reasonably 
suspected criminal activity directly contradicts the officer's testimony at the suppression hearing. 
Officer Edwards testified that although he was concerned about Green's behavior during the 
initial encounter, until he discovered the outstanding warrants he "didn't necessarily have a 
reason to hold him." (R. 39:29). 
Furthermore, Officer Edwards agreed that the expired license plates on Green's vehicle 
did not constitute criminal activity because Green was parked on private property (R. 38:27). 
3Upon learning that Green resided at a community care living center for mentally disabled people, the 
officer testified at the suppression hearing that he "thought that his slow responses may be contributed to any type 
of disability that he may have" (R. 38:31). 
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The officer obviously knew that he could not cite Defendant for expired plates until he pulled 
onto public roads. / . 
ARGUMENT 
I. GREEN WAS SEIZED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT AT THE TIME THE OFFICER REQUESTED GREEN'S 
IDENTIFICATION AND RETURNED WITH IT TO HIS PATROL CAR. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants 
j shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution contains nearly the same language as the federal 
constitution. Green was stopped and searched illegally under both the United States Constitution 
and the Utah Constitution. 
The search and seizure limitations of the fourth amendment and article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution are applicable to investigatory stops or seizures that are not official arrests. State v. 
Trujillo 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). When a person remains not in the spirit of 
cooperation with an officer, but because he believes that he is not free to leave, a seizure has 
occurred. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined three levels of police encounters together with the 
standard for justifying such a detention: •*•• 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion that 
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
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must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). In the present case, The trial court 
determined that the officers initial contact and questioning of Green constituted a level-one 
encounter, notwithstanding Green's argument that the officer blocked Green's vehicle, shined his 
lights into his vehicle, and created circumstances equivalent to a defacto stop.4 The officer 
testified that he first made contact with Green to determine whether he was okay, and whether he 
had recently seen anyone pass through the parking lot. (R. 38:9). The trial court determined, 
however, that once the officer asked Green for his driver's license and permission to return with 
it to his patrol car, the encounter rose to a "level two" stop (R. 25). 
The trial court correctly cited authority to support its finding of a level two seizure. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 762-763 (Utah 1991), held that the 
defendant was "seized" when the officer "took [the defendant's] name and birth date and 
expected her to wait while he ran a warrants check." The trial court also cited State v. Godina-
Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In that case, Utah's court of appeals held that 
the defendants "were not free to leave because the deputy continued to hold their papers after he 
had satisfied himself that they were not intoxicated." In this case, before the officer reasonably 
suspected any criminal activity, he asked Green to surrender his driver's license and wait while 
4
 The trial court held: "The initial inquiry, clearly a level one stop, did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
seizure and was therefore lawful" (R. 26). 
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he returned to his vehicle to "check on a few things" (R. 38:13). The trial court held at that point 
of the encounter, Green reasonably believed that he was not free to leave (R. 25). 
In addition, the State conceded that the stop rose to a level two encounter even before the 
officer asked Green for identification. The State argued at the close of the suppression hearing 
that the stop "immediately went to a level two as [the officer] discussed and conversed with 
[Green]. And then because of that, obtained the driver's license, some identification, went back 
to his patrol car, went back to his car [sic], and found there were warrants on him" (R. 38:36). 
Appellant now argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously determined that Green 
was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes at the time Officer Edwards requested Green's 
identification and permission to return with it to his patrol car. This argument clearly contradicts 
the concession the State made at the suppression hearing that a level two seizure did in fact 
occur. If the trial court erred in its conclusion that Green was unjustifiably detained, that error 
was clearly invited by the State and Appellant is prohibited from complaining of it on appeal. 
The "invited error" doctrine prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then 
complaining of it on appeal." State v. Lyman. 953 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) {quoting 
State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1990) (holding a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial 
when that party lead the trial court into committing the error). 
Appellant also argues on appeal that Green consented to the continued detention because 
he responded "okay" to the officer's request for permission to take Green's identification back to 
his patrol car "to check on a few things" ® 38:13). Whether Green consented to the continued 
8 
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detention is irrelevant considering the fact that the State admitted that a level two seizure had 
begun before the officer even asked for Green's identification (R. 38:36). 
II. GREEN'S LEVEL TWO SEIZURE WAS UNSUPPORTED BY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
A level two stop "is justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer has 
a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity." State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). The State's argument that Green's detention beyond the officer's initial inquiries 
was justified is erroneous and unsupported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 
The trial court found that Green's delayed responses were not enough to raise the 
officer's concern that Green was under the influence of drugs or alcohol to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminality. The trial court determined that, because the officer failed to confirm or 
deny whether Green's behavior was the result of drugs or alcohol use, or something else, any 
suspicion that Green was involved in criminal activity was unreasonable (R. 25-24). It should be 
noted that subsequent to Green's arrest, the officer discovered that Green's slower than normal 
responses during the initial encounter were likely the result of a mental impairment.5 However, 
as the record reflects, Green did respond rationally to all of the officer's questions.6 
In addition, at the suppression hearing, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked 
the officer whether Green was free to leave at anytime before the officer discovered Green's 
5Upon learning that Green resided at a community care living center for mentally disabled people, the 
officer testified at the suppression hearing that he "thought that his slow responses may be contributed to any type 
of disability that he may have" (R. 3 8:31). 
6Even though officer Edwards testified at the suppression hearing that Green's response to his questions 
were delayed, they were certainly rational. To Officer Edwards question whether Green was okay, Green responded 
by asking the officer if he was doing something wrong. To the officer's next question, whether Green had seen 
anyone recently pass through the parking lot, Green responded, "I was just listening to my radio" (R. 38:10-11). 
9 
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warrants. The officer responded that although he was "a little concerned with [Green's] 
responses . . . at that time [he] didn't necessarily have a reason to hold him" (R. 38:29). The 
officer admitted concern but clearly indicated that he had no reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity until he discovered the outstanding warrants for Green. Furthermore, Officer Edwards 
agreed that the expired license plates on Green's vehicle did not constitute criminal activity 
because Green was parked on private property (R. 38:27). The officer obviously knew that he 
could not cite Defendant for expired plates until he pulled onto public roads. Appellant's 
repeated claims that the officer reasonably suspected criminal activity contradicts the officer's 
testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the trial court was that the officer's initial contact with Green rose 
from a level one to a level two encounter, and according to the officer's testimony, the level two 
detention was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. A level two seizure absent reasonable 
suspicion left the trial court with no choice but to grant Green's Motion to Suppress. 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Green respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the unreasonable 
stop and detention of Green. 
DATED this )S day of December, 1998. 
(/o^/L<^ 
Randall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
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